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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
            
No. 04-2295
            
NATHAN F., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL
GUARDIANS, HARRY F. AND AMY F.; 
HARRY F.; AMY F., IN THEIR OWN CAPACITY
Appellants
v.
THE PARKLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT
          
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 03-cv-04714)
District Judge: Honorable James K. Gardner
         
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 2, 2005
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed June 17, 2005)
OPINION OF THE COURT
         
2FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
This case involves an attorney’s fee petition under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act.  The plaintiffs filed a fee petition in the District Court, based on a provision
in a private settlement with the Parkland School District, providing that the settlement be
considered a “judicial consent decree” for fee-shifting purposes.  However, the District Court
held that the provision could not be given effect, depriving the plaintiffs of the prevailing
party status necessary to prevail in a fee petition.  The District Court also rejected the petition
because it found that the plaintiffs had not attained a sufficient change in their legal
relationship with the school district to render them prevailing parties in the dispute.  We will
affirm on the first ground, as our precedent requires some actual judicial imprimatur in order
for a settlement to confer prevailing party status.
I.
Nathan F.’s parents brought an administrative action under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) to compel his dual-enrollment in a public school and
private school in order to address certain disabilities.  The matter was settled privately by the
parties, and the settlement contained a provision stating that the settlement “shall have the
effect of [a] judicial consent decree for purposes of [the fee-shifting statute] entitling the
Parents to seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees and costs in an appropriate forum; however
nothing set forth in this Agreement shall compel any award of attorney’s fees and costs.”
The parents sought attorney’s fees, but the District Court rejected their petition because it
3found that the parents were not “prevailing parties” as understood in the fee-shifting context.
The District Court held that private settlements could not confer such status and the judicial
consent decree provision was invalid as the parties could not create judicial approval merely
by agreement.  The District Court also found that the settlement did not provide sufficient
relief to Nathan to find a material alteration in the legal relationship between the parties, also
precluding fees.  The parents appeal both findings.
II.
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., provides that “[i]n any action or proceeding
brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees
as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party,” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).   “The Supreme Court has held that ‘plaintiffs may be considered
“prevailing parties” for attorney’s fees purposes if they succeed on any significant issue in
litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.’”  John T.
ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275,
278-79 (1st Cir. 1978))). “Accordingly, ‘[t]he touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must
be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress
sought to promote in the fee statute.’” Id. (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland
Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989)).
“[T]he [Supreme] Court [has] distinguished between court-approved settlements and
Although Truesdell was decided in the § 1988 fee-shifting context, we have noted1
that decisions concerning the meaning of “prevailing party” as used in § 1988 are
“‘generally applicable in all cases in which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a
“prevailing party.”’”  John T., 318 F.3d at 555 n.4 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n.7).
4
private settlements, stating that ‘private settlements do not entail the judicial approval and
oversight involved in consent decrees.  And federal jurisdiction to enforce a private
contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are
incorporated into the order of dismissal.’”  Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159,
164 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health
& Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 604 n.7 (2001)).  Accordingly, we have required that private
settlements be judicially sanctioned in order to confer prevailing party status for IDEA fee-
shifting purposes.  See John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d
545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003) (refusing to find prevailing party status where, “[a]lthough [plaintiff]
undoubtedly realized an objective of his litigation upon obtaining an acceptable IEP which
placed him in the public schools, this result was not ‘judicially sanctioned’” because
“[plaintiff] and the DCIU developed the IEP through negotiations out of court, and no court
has endorsed the agreement with a ‘judicial imprimatur’”); cf. Truesdell, 290 F.3d at 165
(finding a stipulated settlement to be “judicially sanctioned” because it: (1) contained
mandatory language, (2) was entitled “Order,” (3) bore the signature of the District Court
judge, and (4) provided for judicial enforcement).1
There is only one distinguishing factor between this case and John T. on the prevailing
We need not consider whether the District Court was correct in holding that there2
was an insufficient change in the parties’ legal relationship to confer prevailing party
status on the plaintiffs.
5
party issue: here, the settlement contained the provision purportedly giving it the effect of a
consent decree for IDEA fee-shifting purposes.  However, the Supreme Court, in discussing
the distinction between consent decrees and private settlements, noted the presence of
oversight and approval by a court in the former category.  Parties cannot create such judicial
imprimatur by stipulation, and therefore the provision referenced above cannot be given
effect.  Accordingly, this case is controlled by Truesdell and John T., and the facts are
materially indistinguishable from those in John T., in which prevailing party status was found
to be lacking.  Because the plaintiffs cannot be considered prevailing parties for IDEA fee-
shifting purposes, their petition for fees must be denied.2
III.
For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the decision of the District Court
denying attorney’s fees.
